Texas Wesleyan Law Review
Volume 16

Issue 2

Article 4

1-1-2010

The Anti-concurrent Clause and Its Impact on Texas Residents
After Hurricane Ike
Amber L. Altemose

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr

Recommended Citation
Amber L. Altemose, The Anti-concurrent Clause and Its Impact on Texas Residents After Hurricane Ike, 16
Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 201 (2010).
Available at: https://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V16.I2.3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Texas Wesleyan Law Review by an authorized editor of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

Altemose: The Anti-concurrent Clause and Its Impact on Texas Residents Afte

COMMENTS
THE ANTI-CONCURRENT CLAUSE AND ITS
IMPACT ON TEXAS RESIDENTS
AFTER HURRICANE IKE
By Amber L. Altemose
I. INTRODUCTION ..........................................
II. BACKGROUND OF THE ANTI-CONCURRENT CLAUSE ....
III. DEVELOPMENT OF TEXAS CASE LAW INTERPRETING

201
202

INSURANCE POLICIES WHEN CONCURRENT CAUSES OF

DAMAGE OCCUR .......................................

204

A. Before Anti-Concurrent Clauses: Development of
Texas Case Law Interpreting Insurances Policies
When Concurrent Causes of Damage Occur ........ 204
B. Post Anti-Concurrent Clauses: Development of Texas
Case Law Interpreting the Anti-Concurrent
209
Clause ..............................................
C. Conclusion of Texas Case Law Development on
Concurrent Causes and the Anti-Concurrent
212
Clause ..............................................
IV.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S PERCEPTION OF THE ANTI-

CONCURRENT CLAUSE ..................................
V.

VI.
V II.

213

PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE ANTI-

CONCURRENT CLAUSE .................................

217

A. Courts Should Render the Clause Unenforceable ....
B. If Courts Uphold the Clause, the Clause Should be
Made Apparent to Policyholders ....................
C. Establish a New, Single Form of Insurance..........

218

THE INSURANCE COMPANIES' ARGUMENT ..............

CONCLUSION ............................................

I.

221
221
222
222

INTRODUCTION

A Texas homeowner maintaining a homeowner's insurance policy, a
flood insurance policy, and a windstorm insurance policy reasonably
expects to have full coverage in the event of a hurricane. But after
Hurricane Katrina pummeled the Gulf Coast in 2005, insurance companies in Louisiana and Mississippi began denying claims based on
anti-concurrent clauses in their homeowners' insurance policies.' Litigation ensued, and the Fifth Circuit held that anti-concurrent clauses
1. See Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1873 (2008); Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d
346, 349 (5th Cir. 2007).
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are valid and enforceable.' As a result, insurance companies in Texas
may follow suit and deny claims to Texas homeowners affected by
Hurricane Ike based on the anti-concurrent clause.
A homeowner's insurance policy typically contains a section detailing both covered perils and non-covered perils. Covered perils may
include wind damage, for example, and non-covered perils may include flood damage. Some insurance policies also contain an anti-concurrent clause, which may be troublesome for some Texas
homeowners after Hurricane Ike. The problem an anti-concurrent
clause presents is simple-it denies coverage to policyholders for
damages caused by a covered peril.3 By validating anti-concurrent
clauses, the Fifth Circuit denied recovery for damages caused by a
peril covered under the policy. This Comment will explain the development of Texas case law interpreting insurance policies when concurrent causes of damage occur; the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of anticoncurrent clauses; and the legal effect of the anti-concurrent clause in
Texas.

II.

BACKGROUND OF THE ANTI-CONCURRENT CLAUSE

The prudent homeowner residing along the Gulf Coast maintains a
homeowner's insurance policy, a flood insurance policy, and a windstorm insurance policy.4 A windstorm insurance policy, and some
homeowner's insurance policies, insures damage to the policyholder's
roof caused by high winds, as well as water damages resulting from a
tear or hole in the roof caused by strong winds. 5 But a homeowner's
insurance policy will not cover all types of water damage. 6 For example, most coastal homeowner's insurance policies will not cover water
damage7 caused by "flood, surface water, waves, tidal water or tidal
waves, overflow of streams or other bodies of water or spray, whether
2. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 436; Tuepker, 507 F.3d at 356.
3. See David J. Rosenberg et al., Insurance Industry Woes in the Aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrinaand Rita, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 141, 152 (2006).
4. The Author assumes that the homeowner's insurance policy covers windstorm
damage, eliminating the need for the homeowner to obtain insurance through the
Texas Windstorm Insurance Association. Although some private insurance companies
cover windstorm damage in the policy, see infra note 5, many insurance companies do
not and as a result the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association was created. See Texas
Windstorm Insurance Association, http://www.twia.org/AboutTWIA.aspx (last visited
Aug. 17, 2009).
5. See TEX. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. Co., TEX. HOMEOWNERS POLICY-FORM
A 6 provision 3(b) (2003) [hereinafter FARM BUREAU HOMEOWNERS POLICY]; STATE
FARM INS., HOMEOWNERS POLICY, 7 provision 2 (1983) [hereinafter STATE FARM
HOMEOWNERS POLICY].
6. FARM BUREAU HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 5, at 7 provision 1(b); see
also STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 5, at 10 provision 2(c).
7. See FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM, MYTHS AND FACTS
AnoUT THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 2 (2007), available at http://

www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3002 (go to "Resource File" and select
"View/Download/Print" link) [hereinafter FEMA MYTHS].
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or not driven by wind." 8 In fact, the majority of insurance policies
expressly exclude flood claims.9 As a result, the federal government
created the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)' ° to provide
federally backed flood insurance through private insurance
companies. 1
If a community is eligible to participate in the NFIP, the residents of
that community may obtain flood insurance otherwise unavailable in
the traditional insurance market.' 2 NFIP-supplied flood insurance is
separate from a standard homeowner's policy.' 3 Therefore, if a homeowner decides against purchasing separate NFIP flood insurance, the
house is not protected against
water damages resulting from flood,
14
etc.
wave,
tidal
surge,
storm
When a homeowner purchases a homeowner's insurance policy and
a flood insurance policy, he or she can reasonably expect to be fully
covered in the event of a hurricane. 5 In fact, a homeowner can reasonably expect that if wind damage occurs the homeowner's insurance
policy will cover the damages. The homeowner can also reasonably
expect that if flood damage occurs the flood insurance policy will
cover the damages.
But many insurance policies contain anti-concurrent clauses. The
following is an example of a typical anti-concurrent clause:
We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not
have occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded events. We do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the
cause of the excluded event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c)
whether other causes acted concurrently or in sequence with the
excluded event to produce the loss . . as a result of any combination of . . . [wiater [diamage, meaning . . . flood, surface water,
.

waves, tidal water, tsunami, seiche, overflow of a body of water, or
spray from any of these, all whether driven by wind or not.1 6
Anti-concurrent clauses are easier to understand when applying it to
recent disasters, such as Hurricane Ike. Hurricane Ike produced
8.

FARM BUREAU HOMEOWNERS POLICY,

supra note 5, at 7 provision 1(b).

9. See FEMA MYTHS, supra note 7.

10. See FEMA,

NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 1

(2002)

http://www.fema.gov/business/nfip/ (Select National Flood Insurance Program link in
left column, then select NFIP Program Description link. Scroll down to Resource File
and select View/Download/Print link) [hereinafter NFIP DESCRIPTION]. A program
similar to the NFIP was proposed in the early 1950s when it was not profitable for
private insurance companies to provide flood insurance at an affordable price. Id.
11. See FEMA MYTHS, supra note 7.
12. Id.; NFIP DESCRIPTION, supra note 10, at 2.
13. See FEMA MYTHS, supra note 7.
14. See FARM BUREAU HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 5, at 7 provision l(b);
see also STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 5, at 10 provision 2(c).
15. In the event that a homeowner's insurance policy does not cover windstorm, a
separate windstorm policy should be obtained. See Texas Windstorm Insurance Association, supra note 4.
16. STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 5, at 7 provision 2(a)(1).
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strong winds1 7 that caused roof damage to many houses. Hurricane
Ike also produced a large storm surge that flooded many houses or
completely destroyed houses leaving only the concrete slab.1 8 Based
on the language of the anti-concurrent clause, the insurance company
may deny a claim because a covered peril, windstorm, and an excluded peril, storm surge, concurrently caused damage to the house.
Although Texas courts are experienced in interpreting insurance policies when concurrent causes of damage result from a hurricane,' 9
Texas courts have had little opportunity to grapple with the anti-concurrent clause and how it may affect policyholders in the aftermath of
Hurricane Ike. z°

III.

DEVELOPMENT OF TEXAS CASE LAW INTERPRETING
INSURANCE POLICIES WHEN CONCURRENT

CAUSES OF DAMAGE OCCUR

Since the late 1800s, Texas courts have dealt with the issue surrounding concurrent causes of damage and its affect on insurance policies.21 Because hurricanes produce water and wind, and most
insurance policies exclude either water or wind damage,22 Texas
courts are experienced in interpreting insurance policies regarding
concurrent causes of damage.23
A.

Before Anti-Concurrent Clauses: Development of Texas Case
Law Interpreting Insurance Policies When Concurrent
Causes of Damage Occur
1. Pelican Fire Insurance Company v. Troy Co-Op. Association

In 1890, the Texas Supreme Court rendered its first decision interpreting an insurance policy's coverage of concurrent causes of damage
in Pelican Fire Insurance Company v. Troy Co-Op. Association.24 The

insurance policy protected the insured's house from loss caused by
fire, but the policy contained an exclusion that prevented the insured
17. FEMA, HURRICANE IKE IMPACT REPORT 1 (2008), available at http://www.
fema.gov/pdf/hazard/hurricane/2008/ike/impact-report.pdf [hereinafter IMPACT REPORT]. Winds were recorded at 110 mph when Hurricane Ike made landfall. Id.
18. Id. at 16.
19. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1971).
20. See Lexington Ins. Co. v. Unity/Waterford-Fair Oaks, Ltd., No. Civ. A.
399CV1623D, 2002 WL 356756, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2002).
21. Pelican Fire Ins. Co. v. Troy Co-Op. Ass'n., 77 Tex. 225, 226-27, 13 S.W. 980,
981 (1890).
22. See FARM BUREAU HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 5, at 7 provision 1(b);
see also STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY, supra note 5, at 10 provision 2(c).

23. See Pelican Fire Ins. Co., 77 Tex. at 225, 13 S.W. at 981; Palatine Ins. Co. v.
Petrovich, 235 S.W. 929, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1917, no writ); Palatine Ins.
Co. v. Coyle, 196 S.W. 560, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1917), affd, 222 S.W. 973
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, judgm't adopted); Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berglund, 393 S.W.2d 309, 309 (Tex. 1965); McKillip, 469 S.W.2d at 160.
24. Pelican Fire Ins. Co., 77 Tex. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
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from collecting on the insurance policy if the fire was caused by a
hurricane or if the building fell for any reason other than fire. 5
The house caught on fire either during or immediately following a
hurricane, and soon after the house fell.26 Evidence established that
the fire was caused by falling timbers that broke a lamp in the house.2 7
To prevail, the insured had the burden of proving that the fire destroyed the house and that the fire was not caused by the hurricane or
the fallen house. 28 Based on the evidence, the court found that the
fire was caused by either the hurricane or the fallen house.2 9 Therefore, the exclusion in the policy prevented the insured from recovering
monetary damages for its loss.30
This case established the burden imposed on the insured when challenging an insurance policy. Under Pelican, the insured had the burden to prove that the property was destroyed by a covered peril, as
well as prove that the loss did not fall within one of the exclusions
contained in the policy. 3 The insured was able to prove that the
property was destroyed by the covered peril of fire;3 2 but the insured
could not prove that the fire did not fall under the excluded perils, i.e.,
that the fire was not caused by a hurricane or the fallen house. Therefore, the insured could not recover.33
The burden of proof in Pelican was modified in 1940 by Rule 94 of
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.3 4 Rule 94 shifts the burden to the
insurance company to prove that the loss was caused by an excluded
peril.35 Once the insurance company proves that the loss was caused
by an excluded peril, the burden shifts back to the insured to prove
otherwise.3 6
2.

PalatineInsurance Company v. Petrovich

In 1915 a devastating hurricane that produced high winds and a
storm surge hit Galveston Island, Texas. Once again, Texas courts
were presented with the issue of concurrent causes of property loss
and an insurance policy that excludes one of the causes.
Steve Petrovich obtained an insurance policy from Palatine Insurance Company that insured his house against damage caused by tor25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
Id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
Id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
Id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
Id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
Id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
Id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
See id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
Id. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
Id.
Pelican Fire Ins. Co., 77 Tex. at 227-28, 13 S.W. at 981.
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But the policy excluded damage

caused by high water or tidal wave. The hurricane produced a large
storm surge that was accompanied by high winds, and because of the
combined perils, Petrovich's house was swept away to sea. 38 Petrovich argued that his house was destroyed when the wind was blowing
at its highest velocity, and that his house was blown away by the wind
and not by high water or tidal wave.39

The insurance company defended on the grounds that the parties
contracted out of the loss by excluding loss or damages resulting from
high water or tidal wave.4 0 As a result of the exclusion, the insurance
company contended that it did not have to pay for any loss caused by
high water.41
The Galveston Court of Civil Appeals held that the insurance policy
was a policy against wind alone, and not a policy against loss resulting
partly by wind and partly by high water. n2 Thus, any damages caused
by water and wind combined could not be segregated.43 Because the
water concurrently contributed to the loss of Petrovich's house, the
exclusion in the policy prevented Petrovich from holding the insurance company liable.44 Therefore, Petrovich was unable to collect
damages from the insurance company for the loss of his house.
3. PalatineInsurance Company v. Coyle
B. A. Coyle lived on Galveston Island, Texas, and insured his apartment with Palatine Insurance Company. 5 The policy covered loss or
damage caused by tornado, windstorm, or cyclone.4 6 The policy did

not cover loss or damage caused by tidal wave or high water.4 7 The
hurricane of 1915 that swept Petrovich's house to sea 48 also wreaked
havoc on Coyle's apartment. 49 The wind and water from the hurricane caused significant damage to the interior and exterior portions of
the apartment. 50 The insurance company denied Coyle's claim and
37. Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovich, 235 S.W. 929, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1917, no writ).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 931.
43. Id. at 930.
44. Id.
45. Palatine Ins. Co. v. Coyle, 196 S.W. 560, 561 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1917), affd, 222 S.W. 973 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, judgm't adopted).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Petrovich, 235 S.W. at 930.
49. Coyle, 196 S.W. at 561.
50. Id.
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defended on the grounds that water caused the damages-the same
exclusion that was at issue in the Petrovich case. 5 '
During the course of the suit, the parties stipulated that the total
loss and damage caused by the storm amounted to $4,512.43.52 Of
that amount, the parties stipulated that $500 of damage was caused by
the wind, independent of water. 53 The parties further stipulated that
$660 of damage was caused by water or rain that entered through an
opening in the roof as a result of the wind damage.5 4 Therefore
$3,352.43 of the loss was caused by the combined action of wind and
water.
Once again, the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals concluded that
the insurance policy was a policy against damages caused by wind
alone, not damages caused partly by wind and partly by high water.56
The court based this determination on "elementary rule[s] of [contract] interpretation., 57 The court reasoned that by placing the exclusions in the policy, the insurance company intended to indemnify the
insured for losses only attributable to wind.5 8
The court held that the insurance company was not liable for damages caused by the combined action of wind and water.5 9 But deviating from the Petrovich case, the court segregated the damages to
Coyle's apartment based upon the stipulated agreement. 60 The court
rendered judgment for Coyle in the amount of $1,160-$500 for the
damage caused by wind and $660 for the damage caused by rain that
entered through openings in the roof caused by the wind.61
Coyle appealed the judgment of the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals, and the Texas Commission of Appeals heard the case.6 2 The
Commission issued an opinion and affirmed the ruling of the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals. 63 The Texas Supreme Court adopted the
opinion of the Texas Commission of Appeals and added that the damage caused concurrently by the water was contracted out of the policy
and the only thing left to recover was loss caused solely by the wind. 6
The insurance policies at issue in the Coyle case and the Petrovich
case were exactly the same, yet the outcomes were different. Factu51. See Coyle, 196 S.W. at 562; Petrovich, 235 S.W. at 930.
52. Coyle, 196 S.W. at 561.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 563.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 565.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S.W.973, 973 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, judgm't
adopted), aff'g 196 S.W. 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1917).
63. Id. at 975.
64. Id. at 976.
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ally, the difference between the two cases is the damages sustained to
the property. Petrovich lost his entire house,6 5 whereas Coyle received substantial damage to his apartment.66 But the courts come to
different conclusions regarding the policies: in Petrovich, the court
would not segregate the damages because it held the policy was not
divisible; 67 in Coyle, the court segregated the damages as agreed upon
by the parties.68 The opinion in Coyle does not detail why the court
segregated the damages, and it may have come down to the fact that
Coyle was able to obtain tangible evidence of the causes of damage
because his apartment survived the hurricane.
4.

Travelers Indemnity Company v. McKillip

In 1971 the McKillips owned a poultry house that was insured by
Travelers Indemnity Company.69 The policy covered damages to the
poultry house caused by windstorm, but excluded damages caused by
snowstorm. 70 A tremendous windstorm swept across the McKillips'
property and struck the poultry house.7 1 The McKillips, however,
failed to inspect the house and testified that that no apparent damage
was detected.72 Six days later, four to five inches of snow fell on the
poultry house and the poultry house collapsed.7 3

Because the McKillips alleged that the poultry house was damaged
by an insured peril, windstorm, the McKillips had the burden of proving that the damage was caused by the windstorm.74 Once the McKillips pleaded windstorm damage, the burden shifted to the insurance
company to plead an exclusion in the policy to successfully deny coverage. The insurance company pleaded the exclusion of snowstorm,
and the burden shifted back to the McKillips to prove "the damage
was caused solely by windstorm," or to segregate "the damage caused
76
by [windstorm] from that [damage] caused by the snowstorm.
The jury found that the dominant efficient cause of the damage to
the poultry house was caused by windstorm and not solely by the
weight of the snow. 77 As a result of this finding, the McKillips were
awarded the replacement costs of the poultry house. 78 In affirming
65. Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovich, 235 S.W. 929, 930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1917, no writ).
66. Coyle, 196 S.W. at 560.
67. Petrovich, 235 S.W. at 930.
68. Coyle, 196 S.W. at 565.
69. Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 161 (Tex. 1971).
70. Id. at 161-62.
71. Id. at 161.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
75. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d at 162.
76. Id.
77. Id.at 161.
78. Id.
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the trial court, the Eastland Court of Civil Appeals held that where a
loss occurs under a standard windstorm policy and an excluded peril
contributes to the loss, the insured can recover if the insured can
prove that windstorm was the "dominant efficient" cause of the loss.7 9
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate
court because the evidence supported a finding that a portion of the
loss was caused by snowstorm.80 To recover the full replacement costs
of the poultry house, the evidence must have supported the McKillips'
contention that the damage to the poultry house was caused solely by
windstorm, and that no damage was caused by the snowstorm.8 1 If the
damage to the poultry house was the result of windstorm and snowstorm, it was the McKillips' burden to segregate the damage caused by
each peril.82
The McKillips, however, did not produce any evidence relating to
the damage caused by the wind.8 3 No inspection of the poultry house
was made after the windstorm, and the McKillips did not attempt to
estimate the damages caused directly by the wind. 4 Because the
McKillips failed to meet their burden of producing evidence that
would "afford a reasonable basis for estimating the amount of damage
... caused by a risk covered by the insurance policy," the Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment.8 5
The McKillips case illustrates the importance of producing evidence
to support the burden of proof. The McKillips had the burden of
proving that a covered peril damaged the poultry house and the extent
of the damage the covered peril caused. In the event of litigation, it is
important for insureds to determine what caused the damage to their
house, and it is even more important to determine the dollar amount
of damage caused by each peril. Because an insured will recover only
for losses that were caused by the covered peril, it is vital to produce
evidence demonstrating loss caused by the covered peril when a covered peril and an excluded peril concurrently cause damage so the
jury can segregate damages-unless the policy contains an anti-concurrent clause.
B.

Post Anti-Concurrent Clauses: Development of Texas Case Law
Interpreting the Anti-Concurrent Clause

Texas law is settled regarding concurrent causes of damage: as long
as the insured can segregate the damage caused by a covered peril
from the damage caused by an excluded peril, the insured can recover.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 162.
Id.
Id. at 163.
See id. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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But, Texas law is new and unsettled when it comes to the anti-concurrent clause.
1. Wong v. Monticello Insurance Company
Choi Leng Wong obtained an insurance policy for her restaurant
located in the Moke Building in San Antonio, Texas.8 6 After an explosion occurred in an adjacent building, the city ordered the Moke
Building to be demolished. 87 Under Wong's insurance policy, the restaurant was covered for damages caused by explosion or high winds;
but the policy excluded damages that resulted from government-enforced demolition of the property.88
The policy also included an anti-concurrent clause that stated the
insurance company would not pay for damages caused by demolition
"regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently
or in any sequence to the lOSS. ' ' 89 Based on the language of the policy,
if the explosion damaged the restaurant and the extent of the damage
caused the restaurant to be demolished, the anti-concurrent clause
would give the insurance company the right to completely deny
coverage. 90
In 2003 the San Antonio Court of Appeals denied coverage to
Wong based on the anti-concurrent clause. 91 The court reasoned that
even though a covered peril (explosion) combined with a non-covered
peril (demolition) to damage the restaurant, the anti-concurrent
clause excluded coverage.92
This case is an example of the problem an anti-concurrent clause
presents to the insured. Wong purchased insurance coverage for her
restaurant to include any damage caused by explosion or high wind.
As a result of explosion and high wind, the building where her restaurant was located was ordered demolished, which was an excluded
peril. Even if Wong was able to segregate the damage and provide
evidence proving the extent of damage caused by high winds and explosion, the insurance company could still successfully deny her claim
based on the anti-concurrent clause.

86. Wong v. Monticello Ins. Co., No. 04-02-00142-CV, 2003 WL 1522938, at *1
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 26, 2003, pet. denied).
87. Id.

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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Lexington Insurance Company v. Unity!WaterfordFair Oaks, Limited

Texas One insured its Oak Meadow Apartments through Lexington
Insurance Company.9 3 The second floor of the apartments sustained
water damage from roof leaks after a severe rainstorm. 94 The insurance policy contained the following anti-concurrent clause: "[t]his
agreement does not insure against loss caused directly or indirectly by
any of the following. Such loss is excluded regardless of any other
cause or event contributing concurrently or in any sequence to the
loss." 95 The policy then listed exclusions, including property
maintenance.9 6
Lexington argued that the roof leaks that caused the damage were
caused in part by inadequate maintenance. 97 Lexington's expert concluded that the roof leaks were caused by a "lack of proper and adequate maintenance of the roof" and Texas One's expert concluded
that "the roofs evidenced a lack of maintenance." 98
Consistent with Rule 94 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure,9 9 the
Northern District of Texas placed the burden of proof on Lexington to
prove that the damages fell within the exclusionary language contained in the anti-concurrent clause.' 0 0 Thus, Lexington had to prove
that inadequate maintenance was a contributing cause to the roof
leaks. 10 1 If Lexington could show that inadequate maintenance of the
roof contributed to the roof leaks, Lexington would be "exempt from
all liability for all damages caused directly or indirectly by the inadequate 02
maintenance of the roof" based on the anti-concurrent
clause.1
Because the Lexington case was litigated in federal court, the court
conducted an Erie analysis and applied Texas state law. 0 3 But there
was no Texas precedent analyzing the anti-concurrent clause, the
clause's validity, and whether damages could be segregated because
Wong was decided one year after the Lexington opinion was issued in
93. Lexington Ins. Co. v. Unity/Waterford-Fair Oaks, Ltd., No. Civ. A.
399CV1623D, 2002 WL 356756, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2002).
94. Id.

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.

99. TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
100. Lexington Ins. Co., 2002 WL 356756, at *4.

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. Under the Erie doctrine, when a state claim is litigated in federal court, for
example a breach of contract claim, the federal court applies the substantive state law

by making an "Erie" guess as to how the state supreme court would resolve the issue.
See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1938).
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2002.104 Therefore, the court looked at how other jurisdictions treated

the legal effect of the anti-concurrent clause. 10 5 According to the
court, the weight of the authority in other jurisdictions supported the
court's holding that the anti-concurrent clause completely barred coverage to the insured. 106
3.

Claunch v. Travelers Lloyds Insurance Company

Claunch, a 2008 case that was decided in the Northern District of
Texas, examined whether the policy's water-exclusion clause barred
coverage to the insured.' 0 7 The court held that the water-exclusion
108
clause was not ambiguous and barred the insured's claim.
Although this case did not turn on whether the anti-concurrent
clause barred coverage, the court noted that "the [p]olicy's 'anti-concurrent cause' provision further supports [the] conclusion, providing
that the 'loss or damage

. . .

is excluded regardless of any other cause

or event that contributes concurrently or in any sequence to the
loss.'"109 Thus, despite the water-exclusion clause, the insured's claim
would not have survived because of the anti-concurrent clause.
C. Conclusion of Texas Case Law Development on Concurrent
Causes and the Anti-Concurrent Clause

The previous cases demonstrate the development of Texas case law
regarding concurrent causation. Since the 1800s, Texas courts have
limited an insured's recovery to damages that the insured could prove
was caused by a covered peril. One reason courts have taken this
stance is the parties' intent. For example, if the parties contracted to
only pay for and provide coverage for wind damage, the insurance
company should not be responsible for water damage that also
occurred.
Additionally, courts want to limit recovery to covered perils because the insurance companies base their premiums on those covered
perils. Insurance companies set aside a certain amount of money to
pay for covered perils based on the risk of that covered peril occurring. For example, if the insured lives on the Gulf Coast and main104. See Wong v. Monticello Ins. Co., No. 04-02-00142-CV, 2003 WL 1522938, at *1
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 26, 2003, pet. denied).
105. Id. In determining that coverage was barred because of the anti-concurrent
clause, the court relied on the following cases to support its holding: State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Alaska 1996); Pakmark Corp. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 943 S.W.2d 256, 259-62 (Mo. App. 1997) (each holding that when a
covered peril concurrently combines with an excluded peril to create the loss, coverage is barred because of the anti-concurrent clause).
106. Wong, 2003 WL 1522938, at *1.
107. Claunch v. Travelers Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 4:07-CV-548-A, 2008 WL 114844, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 10, 2008).
108. Id. at *4.
109. Id. at *4 n.4.
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tains windstorm insurance, the insurance company will set aside a
certain amount of money to pay for windstorm damage in the event of
a hurricane. The insurance companies do not set aside money for
flood damage if flood damage is excluded from the policy. Therefore,
courts are rightfully unwilling to require insurance companies to pay
for losses that the insurance companies are unable to anticipate.
Based on these reasons, it is logical for the damages to be segregated when covered perils combine with excluded perils to create the
loss. But as the law stands in Texas, the anti-concurrent clause may
completely deny coverage for Hurricane Ike victims whose houses
were damaged by a covered peril.
IV.

THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S PERCEPTION OF THE
ANTI-CONCURRENT CLAUSE

After Hurricane Katrina destroyed much of the Louisiana/Mississippi coast, litigation ensued when homeowners were denied coverage
partly because of the anti-concurrent clause. The following cases decided by the Fifth Circuit are important to Texas residents in the event
Hurricane Ike litigation reaches the federal courts.
A.

Leonard v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company

110
In 2005 the Leonards owned a two-story house in Mississippi.
The storm surge that accompanied Hurricane Katrina caused the Leonards' house to sustain significant damage to the first floor."' The
second floor was virtually unscathed." 2 Wind also accompanied Hurricane Katrina and caused the house to receive modest damage, such
as broken roof shingles;
damaged garage walls; and a golf-ball-sized
113
hole in a window.
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company insured the Leonards'
house." 4 The insurance policy insured the house for wind damage,
excluded water damage, and contained an anti-concurrent clause. 1 5
After an adjuster evaluated the Leonards' house, Nationwide tendered $1,661.71 to the Leonards for damage caused solely by wind,
but denied all other damage-based claims because of the anti-concurrent clause. 116 As a result, the Leonards sued Nationwide.
The Southern District of Mississippi entered judgment in favor of
the Leonards in the amount of $1,228.16, which represented the dam-

110. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 424 (5th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1873 (2008).
111. Id. at 426.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 424.
115. Id. at 424-25.
116. Id. at 426.
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ages caused solely by wind.1 17 But the court refused to enforce the
anti-concurrent clause because it was ambiguous.' 8 The district court
further stated that "wind damage was recoverable 'even if it occurred
concurrently or in sequence with the excluded water damage.'119
Under this ruling, an insured could recover for damages caused by
wind, despite situations where wind combined concurrently or sequentially with water to create the loss. 2 ° The district court based this
view on Mississippi precedent that allows an insured to recover for
losses caused by a covered peril that concurrently combines with an
excluded peril.12 1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that the anti-concurrent clause was
not ambiguous, as determined by the district court, and that Mississippi law does not preempt the clause. 1 22 Further, based on the plain
language of the anti-concurrent clause, the Fifth Circuit held that an
insured cannot recover for any wind damage that occurred concurrently or sequentially with water. 123 Thus, an insured cannot recover
for any damage caused by wind if water combined with the wind concurrently or sequentially to create the lOSS.124 As a result, the court
affirmed the district court's award of $1,228.16 to the Leonards for the
damages caused solely by wind. 2 5
To make the interpretation of the anti-concurrent clause more coherent, the Fifth Circuit provided an example:
If, for example, a policyholder's roof is blown off in a storm, and
rain enters through the opening, the damage is covered. Only if
storm-surge flooding-an excluded peril-then inundates the same
area that the rain damaged is the ensuing loss excluded because the
loss was caused concurrently or in sequence by the action of a covered and an excluded peril.' 26
It is this interpretation of the anti-concurrent clause that will make it
difficult for homeowners to recover for wind loss after a major hurricane where storm surge and high winds occur. As stated earlier, windstorm coverage will normally cover water damage to the house in the
event strong winds tear an opening in the roof and rain enters through
the opening.12 7 But in the event that rain does enter the house
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Craig A. Cohen & Mark H. Rosenberg, After the Storm: Courts Grapple
with the Insurance Coverage Issues Resulting from HurricaneKatrina, TORT TRIAL &
INS. PRAC. L.J. 139, 147-48 (2008).
121. Id. at 147.
122. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 430.
123. Id.
124. See Cohen & Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 148.
125. See Leonard, 499 F.3d at 423.
126. Id. at 431.

127. See

STATE FARM HOMEOWNERS POLICY,
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through a tear in the roof (covered peril), and the same part of the
house is inundated with storm surge or some other form of water (excluded peril), all damages are excluded based on the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of the anti-concurrent clause, regardless of the fact that
the rain damage was a covered peril.
The only way an insured may prevail against the anti-concurrent
clause in situations like the Leonards and many Hurricane Ike victims,
according to the Fifth Circuit, is to demonstrate that the anti-concurrent clause is prohibited by "caselaw, statutory law, or public polThe sparse Texas case law examined earlier has thus far
icy. '
upheld anti-concurrent clauses.12 9 Further, statutory law will most
likely not help the insureds because the policies are examined and
approved by the Texas Insurance Commissioner. 30 Therefore, according to the Fifth Circuit, the only way insureds in Texas will prevail
is to argue that the anti-concurrent clause is against public policy.1 '
B.

Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company

While Leonard is the seminal case dealing with the anti-concurrent
clause and the legal effects the clause has on hurricane-ravaged
houses, Tuepker is a "slab case" and its ruling is important for the slab
cases that may arise in the event of Hurricane Ike litigation. 3 2
The Tuepkers' house was completely destroyed by Hurricane Katrina, which left nothing but the slab of the house.' 33 The house was
insured by State Farm for loss caused by windstorm, but excluded loss
caused by water. 1 34 The policy also contained an anti-concurrent
clause.'3635 Based on the policy, State Farm denied the Tuepkers'
claim.1
The Southern District of Mississippi held that the anti-concurrent
clause was ambiguous because the provision purported to exclude the
covered loss of wind when the wind combined with water, an excluded
loss.' 37 Because the policy purported to provide coverage for wind
and simultaneously purported to exclude coverage for wind when
128. Leonard, 499 F.3d at 431.
129. See Wong v. Monticello Ins. Co., No. 04-02-00142-CV, 2003 WL 1522938 at *1
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 26, 2003, pet. denied); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Unity/
Waterford-Fair Oaks, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 399CV1623D, 2002 WL 356756, at *4-5 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 5, 2002).
130. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.35 (Vernon 2009).
131. See Leonard, 499 F.3d at 431; see discussion infra Part V.A.3.
132. A "slab case" refers to the type of case where the house or building was completely destroyed and all that remains is the concrete slab. See Sharon M. Mattox &
David G. Wall, Class Certification for Environmental and Toxic Tort Claims, 2008
A.L.I.-A.B.A. ENVTL. & Toxic TORT LITIG. 3, 18.
133. Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 2007).
134. Id. at 349.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
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water is involved, the court held the anti-concurrent clause ambiguous
and ineffective.1 38
Because Leonard governed the case, the Fifth Circuit held that the
anti-concurrent clause was not ambiguous and should be enforced.13 9
According to the court, "indivisible damage caused by both excluded
perils and covered perils or other causes is not covered" under the
anti-concurrent clause.1 4 °
The difference between Tuepker and Leonard is that the Tuepkers
did not have a house to evaluate the damages caused solely by wind.
At least in Leonard, the homeowners were able to recover for the loss
caused exclusively by wind, albeit a small amount. 1 ' In Tuepker, it
was impossible to determine the damage caused by the wind prior to
the storm surge.142 This is the problem that Hurricane Ike litigants
may face. Without speculating how much damage was caused solely
by wind, it is impossible to ascertain the exact amount of damage and
recover the segregated amount.
Another problem that arises in slab cases is the actual cause of the
loss. Almost all hurricanes produce tornados 143 and it is not out of the
question for a house to be completely leveled by a tornado prior to a
storm surge, leaving the possibility open that a covered peril destroyed the house rather than an excluded peril.
C. Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company
14 4
The Broussards lost their house in 2005 to Hurricane Katrina.
The house was insured through State Farm and the policy covered
damage caused by windstorm. 145 The policy also contained an anticoncurrent clause. 146 Defending on the anti-concurrent clause, State
Farm denied the Broussards' claim. 147 Subsequently, the Broussards
filed suit
arguing that their house was destroyed by "tornadic
1' 48
winds.
The Southern District of Mississippi found that the Broussards'
house was "destroyed during Hurricane Katrina," that the hurricane
was a "windstorm," and that windstorm was covered under the insur-

138. Id.
139. Id. at 354.
140. Id.
141. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1873 (2008).
142. Tuepker, 507 F.3d at 348.
143. Bill McCaul, FAQ: Hurricanes, Typhoons, & Tropical Cyclones http://www.
aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/tcfaq/L3.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2009).
144. Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. 2008).
145. Id. at 622-23.
146. Id. at 623.
147. See id. at 623-24.
148. Id.
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ance policy. 149 Because the house was destroyed by a covered peril,
according to the court, State Farm had the burden to prove the loss
was the result of an excluded peril.15 ° State Farm's expert could not
distinguish between the damage caused by wind from the damage
caused by water because the house was completely destroyed.1 5 ' As a
result, the court held that State Farm did not meet its burden of proof
that the destruction was caused by an excluded peril. 5
In reversing the district court, the Fifth Circuit held that "Hurricane
Katrina's winds were not strong enough to cause structural
damage to
153
the home" and remanded the case for a new trial.
Broussard is a good example of the battle of the experts and what
Texas courts may do in the event of Hurricane Ike litigation surrounding slab cases. The Fifth Circuit looked at the testimony of the experts
to determine that the wind produced by Hurricane Katrina was not
strong enough to completely destroy the house. 5 4 Similarly, Texas
courts will likely rely on expert testimony in determining whether
Hurricane Ike's winds were strong enough to create a total loss. Because slab cases leave nothing on which to base an expert opinion,
these cases will likely be a battle of the experts.
The Katrina litigation that has transpired in the Fifth Circuit has
paved a road for the Texas courts to uphold anti-concurrent clauses in
future Hurricane Ike litigation. The problem the anti-concurrent
clause presents to policyholders is that it has the effect of denying coverage for damages that are covered under the policy, especially in the
event of a hurricane. The slab cases are the most vulnerable because
of the lack of damage to examine in determining wind from water
damage.
V.

PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE
ANTI-CONCURRENT CLAUSE

As discussed earlier, Texas courts have been dealing with concurrent causes of damage since at least the late 1800s.' 55 Consistently,
Texas courts will not allow an insured to recover for damages caused
by an excluded peril.' 5 6 Rather, the courts, and later Rule 94 of the
149. Id. at 623.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 625.
154. Id.
155. Pelican Fire Ins. Co. v. Troy Co-Op. Ass'n., 77 Tex. 225, 226-27, 13 S.W. 980,
981 (1890).
156. See id at 226-27, 13 S.W. at 981; Palatine Ins. Co. v. Petrovich, 235 S.W. 929,
930 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1917, no writ); Coyle v. Palatine Ins. Co., 222 S.W.
973, 976 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, judgm't adopted); Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. 1971).
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Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, require the insured to segregate the
damages caused by included and excluded perils.157
While exclusionary clauses allow the insured to segregate and recover damages caused by a covered peril, 158 anti-concurrent clauses
do not. 159 Essentially, the anti-concurrent clause allows coverage to
be denied for covered perils if the covered peril combines concurrently or sequentially with an excluded peril. Thus, even if damage is
obviously the result of wind, the wind damage cannot be segregated
from the water damage if it combined with the water to create the
loss.
Although Texas courts have come across anti-concurrent clauses,16 °
there is not a single case in Texas that has applied the anti-concurrent
clause to slab cases. In a situation like a slab case, it is impossible to
determine how much damage was caused solely by wind, solely by
water, and how much damage was caused by the combination of wind
and water. 16 ' As a result, homeowners (or former homeowners) af-

fected by Hurricane Ike may not recover anything for the loss of their
house. Because anti-concurrent clauses have the legal effect of deny-

ing claims for a loss that was covered under the insurance policy,
Texas courts should not uphold the clause.
A.

Courts Should Render the Clause Unenforceable

Texas courts should render the anti-concurrent clause unenforceable as one solution. The Fifth Circuit held that the policyholders can
prevail over the anti-concurrent clause by proving that the clause is
contrary to "caselaw, statutory law, or public policy. ''162 The follow-

ing section discusses the probability of prevailing over the anti-concurrent clause in Texas courts in the manner required by the Fifth Circuit.
1. Texas Case Law
According to the Fifth Circuit, one way to prevail over an anti-concurrent clause is to have case law that does not allow an insurance
163
company to preclude recovery for concurrent causes of damage.
But, policyholders are unlikely to prevail over the anti-concurrent
157. Palatine Ins. Co. v. Coyle, 196 S.W. 560, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1917), affid, 222 S.W. 973 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1920, judgm't adopted); McKillip, 469
S.W.2d at 163; TEX. R. Civ. P. 94.
158. See Coyle, 196 S.W. at 565; McKillip, 469 S.W.2d at 163.
159. See Wong v. Monticello Ins. Co., No. 04-02-00142-CV, 2003 WL 1522938 at *1
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Mar. 26, 2003, pet. denied); Lexington Ins. Co. v. Unity/
Waterford-Fair Oaks, Ltd., No. Civ. A. 399CV1623D, 2002 WL 356756, at *4-5 (N.D.
Tex. Mar. 5, 2002).
160. See Wong, 2003 WL 1522938, at *1; Lexington Ins. Co., 2002 WL 356756, at *4.
161. See Cohen & Rosenberg, supra note 120, at 157.
162. See Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 426 (5th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1873 (2008).
163. Id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol16/iss2/4
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V16.I2.3

18

Altemose: The Anti-concurrent Clause and Its Impact on Texas Residents Afte

2010]

THE ANTI-CONCURRENT CLAUSE

clause by relying on Texas case law. Based on the decisions in Wong
and Lexington, in which Texas courts have held the anti-concurrent
clause is enforceable,1 6 4 future Hurricane Ike litigation will likely uphold and enforce the clause.
Further, Texas courts may seem reluctant to render the anti-concurrent clause unenforceable because it will limit the parties' freedom to
contract. By rendering the anti-concurrent clause unenforceable, insurance companies may have to raise insurance premiums in the event
they have to pay for concurrent causes of damage that they would not
otherwise be required to pay. Some consumers may wish to take the
risk of having the anti-concurrent clause in the policy in exchange for
lower premiums. Rendering the clause unenforceable would limit the
consumer's ability to take that risk and freely contract.
Although Texas courts may hesitate to limit the freedom to contract, insurance policies are not the type of negotiable contracts that
allow consumers to freely dictate the terms of the contract. An insurance policy is an adhesion contract and the consumer can take it or
leave it. Thus, hesitation by the courts to limit the freedom to contract
is somewhat unwarranted because the consumer never had the freedom to negotiate the policy.
Because of the unwarranted fear of limiting the freedom to contract, coupled with the Wong and Lexington decisions,16 5 Texas courts
are unlikely to render the anti-concurrent clause unenforceable based
on Texas case law.
2.

Texas Statutory Law

Another way to prevail over the anti-concurrent clause, according
to the Fifth Circuit, is to show that the clause violates statutory law.166
But Texas statutory law requires that insurance policies be adopted by
the Texas Insurance Commissioner. 167 The commissioner may disapprovisions that are unjust, deceptive, or
prove a policy if it contains
68
violate public policy.'
In Leonard, the Fifth Circuit held that the anti-concurrent clause
did not violate statutory law because the clause was approved by the
state insurance commissioner.16 9 Hurricane Ike litigants will most
likely not prevail over the anti-concurrent clause by arguing it violates
Texas statutory law based on the reasoning in Leonard and current
Texas statutory law.
Although the current state of Texas statutory law is stacked against
policyholders, Texas residents should urge the Texas Legislature to
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Wong, 2003 WL 1522938, at *1; Lexington Ins. Co., 2002 WL 356756, at *4-5.
Wong, 2003 WL 1522938, at *1; Lexington Ins. Co., 2002 WL 356756, at *4-5.
Leonard, 469 F.3d at 431.
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.35(a) (Vernon 2009).
Id. art. 5.35(g)(1)(B).
Leonard, 469 F.3d at 435-36.
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change the current law. The legislature can create a law that prohibits
insurance policies from containing anti-concurrent clauses. Until the
Texas Legislature creates new law, policyholders are unlikely to prevail by arguing the anti-concurrent clause violates Texas statutory law.
3.

Texas Public Policy

A third way for courts to render the anti-concurrent clause unenforceable is to conclude that the clause is against public policy. In
Puckett v. United States Fire Insurance Company, the insurance company sought a determination that it was not obligated to pay damages
arising out of a deadly plane crash. 170 The insurance policy contained
a clause that allowed the insurance company to suspend coverage "if
the aircraft . . . airworthiness certificate is not in full force and effect.' 171 A certificate is issued when all maintenance requirements
are conducted through an inspection. 17' Although the certificate had
lapsed, the failure to inspect the plane did not cause the plane to
crash.73

The estate of the insureds argued that to allow an insurance company to escape liability when the breach of contract did not contribute
to the loss is unconscionable and against public policy. 174 The Texas
Supreme Court agreed, and held that it would be against public policy
1 75
to allow an insurance company to avoid liability on a technicality.
The court further stated that to hold otherwise would be to allow the
insurance company to "collect a premium but.., have no exposure to
1 76
risk because the policy would no longer be effective.'
The estate of the insureds in Puckett successfully argued that the
clause at issue was against public policy. Policyholders dealing with
anti-concurrent clauses could use this argument to their advantage. It
could be argued that to allow the insurance company to avoid liability
for wind damage because of an anti-concurrent clause is against public
policy because the insurance company is collecting a premium, yet insulating itself from risk. By insulating itself from any claim that involves wind and water damage concurrently, the insurance company
has no exposure 77to risk, which according to Puckett is against public
1
policy in Texas.
If Hurricane Ike litigants are going to argue that the anti-concurrent
clause should not be enforced, Texas courts, and specifically federal
courts, may follow the Fifth Circuit holding and require litigants to
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 937 (Tex. 1984).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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prove that the clause violates Texas "caselaw, statutory law, or public
policy."17' 8 Based on the current state law and statutory law in Texas,
litigants are unlikely to prevail over the anti-concurrent clause. A
public policy argument may be the only route available for litigants to
invalidate the anti-concurrent clause.
B.

If Courts Uphold the Clause, the Clause Should be Made
Apparent to Policyholders

Another problem with the anti-concurrent clause is that it is another clause stuck in an adhesion contract that the average layperson
is unable to decipher. Most policyholders probably do not know that
the clause is in their policy.
Although the parties to a contract are deemed to know and understand the terms of the contract and its legal effects,17 9 the Texas legislature should require that insurance companies make the clause
apparent. This can be done by placing the clause in a larger and
bolded font. Or it could be done by requiring the policyholder to sign
an acknowledgement that he or she has read the clause and understands its legal effect.
By making the clause apparent to the policyholder, the policyholder
is cognizant of the type of coverage that the insurance company is
providing. Some policyholders do not even realize that their homeowner's insurance policy excludes flood or that they must obtain flood
insurance through a separate policy backed by the National Flood Insurance Program. 180 In fact, sixty-one percent of Texas residents affected by Hurricane Ike did not have flood insurance . 81 By making
the clause apparent to the policyholder, the policyholder understands
the clause and its legal effects, as well as understands that a separate
policy to cover flood damage is needed.
C.

Establish a New, Single Form of Insurance

Under the current system of insurance coverage, the prudent homeowner who lives on the Texas Gulf Coast should obtain a homeowner's insurance policy, a flood insurance policy, and a windstorm
insurance policy (if windstorm is not covered under the homeowner's
insurance policy). But, the current system is broken. After a major
disaster strikes, the windstorm insurance policy is pointing the finger
at the flood insurance policy. The flood insurance policy is pointing
the finger at the windstorm insurance policy. And the homeowner's
178. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1873 (2008).
179. In re Big 8 Food Stores, Ltd., 166 S.W.3d 869, 878 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005,
orig. proceeding).
180. See FloodSmart.gov, Resources: Flood Facts, http://www.floodsmart.gov/flood
smart/pages/flood-facts.jsp.
181. See IMPACt REPORT, supra note 17, at 2.
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insurance policy is pointing the finger at both the windstorm and flood
insurance policy. Stuck in the middle of all of this finger pointing is
the prudent homeowner who is burdened by chasing around the different insurance companies in the hopes that one of the companies
will "pay up."
Therefore, another solution to the anti-concurrent clause is to create a new form of insurance that covers any and all damage that is the
result of a hurricane, such as wind, water, tornado, etc. The Texas
Supreme Court suggested creating a new type of insurance in Hardware Dealers Mutual Insurance Company v. Berglund.1 82 One way,
according to the Court, is to lobby the insurance industry and regulatory authorities.1" 3 Instead of having an "all risks" policy or a "named
peril" policy with exclusions, regulatory authorities could issue hurricane insurance policies that cover any and all damages caused by a
hurricane, including water damage.' 8 4 Homeowners can purchase
peace of mind by knowing that their house is protected, and insurers
will be able to charge the necessary premium to ensure it can cover
any losses caused by a hurricane.
A policy that covers all hurricane damage will (1) decrease the need
for insurance companies to set aside costs for litigation; (2) eliminate
the need for experts used to segregate damages; (3) eliminate the
need to obtain different types of insurance for different types of damage; and (4) decrease the amount of litigation which will in turn reduce the amount of judicial resources necessary to withstand litigation
after a major hurricane.

VI. THE INSURANCE COMPANIES' ARGUMENT
Although this comment discusses the unfairness of the anti-concurrent clause and why the clause should not be enforced, the insurance

companies have an interest in making a profit and protecting themselves from claims in which the insurance companies did not set aside
money to cover. An example of such claims is concurrent causes of
damage caused by covered and non-covered perils.

The insurance companies cannot be blamed for wanting to insulate
themselves from claims they did not intend to cover. As unfair as the

consumer may believe the insurance companies are acting, the consumer had the opportunity to educate himself or herself of the con-

tents and legal effects of the insurance policy.
VII.

CONCLUSION

After Hurricane Katrina, the anti-concurrent clause was used by insurance companies to deny recovery to homeowners along the Gulf
182. Hardware Dealers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Berglund, 393 S.W.2d 309, 314 (Tex. 1965).
183. See id.
184. Id.
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Coast. 8 5 The clause allowed the insurance companies to deny recovery because concurrent causes of damage, water and wind, combined
to damage or destroy the insured's house.
The damage and destruction that Texas homeowners received after
Hurricane Ike are similar to those received by Hurricane Katrina. Because water and wind combined currently to damage or destroy
houses, insurance companies may try to deny recovery based on an
anti-concurrent clause in the policy.
Although the San Antonio Court of Appeals and the Northern District of Texas have upheld the anti-concurrent clause, the Texas Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue. The Texas Supreme Court
should invalidate the anti-concurrent clause because it denies recovery for a peril that is covered under the insurance policy. Further, upholding the clause violates public policy because it allows the
insurance company to insulate it from exposure to risk. Instead of
validating the anti-concurrent clause and denying recovery to the insured, the court should continue to allow the segregation of damages
in the event of concurrent causation.
By invalidating the anti-concurrent clause and requiring insurance
companies to pay for damages that are covered under the insurance
policy, Texas will send a message to insurance companies to fix the
broken system. Not only should the judiciary invalidate the anti-concurrent clause, but the legislature should create a single form of insurance that covers any and all damage caused by a hurricane. This way,
the prudent homeowner can realistically purchase peace of mind.
185. Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 128 S. Ct. 1873 (2008); Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346,
349 (5th Cir. 2007).
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